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It is my privilege to welcome you to our annual E. Harold Hallows Lecture.
This lecture series began in 1995, and we have had the good fortune more or less
annually since then to be joined by a distinguished jurist who spends a day or two
within the Law School community. This is our Hallows Judicial Fellow. Some of
these judges we meet for the first time. Others are more known to us beforehand-
already part of us really. Within that latter category, I am very grateful that today
we have with us two of our past Hallows Fellows. I would like to recognize them.
Chief Justice Shirley Abrahamson of the Wisconsin Supreme Court delivered the
Hallows Lecture in 2003, my first year as dean. She is a friend of the Law School
as well as a friend of this year's Hallows Fellow. The other is Judge Diane Sykes, a
Marquette lawyer (Class of 1984), who is a member of the United States Court of
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit and who delivered the Hallows Lecture last year,
in 2006. Thank you to both Chief Justice Abrahamson and Judge Sykes for being
with us today.
Permit me to tell you something about the individual in whose memory this
lecture stands. E. Harold Hallows was a member of the Wisconsin Supreme Court
from 1958 to 1974, spending the last six of those sixteen years as Chief Justice.
That is a long time on a common-law and constitutional court, and Justice Hallows
not only witnessed but participated in-even helped to cause-significant changes
* Circuit Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit.
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in legal doctrine in this state. All of that might be reason enough to remember him.
But, as many of you are aware, Justice Hallows was Professor Hallows at
Marquette University Law School for 28 years before his appointment to the
Wisconsin Supreme Court. A generation of students took Equity and Equity H
from Professor Hallows, who found time for this undertaking even in the midst of
his work as a lawyer in Milwaukee and his extensive service to court
reorganization and law reform efforts.
This year's Hallows Lecturer is the Honorable Carolyn Dineen King. For the
past twenty-eight years, Judge King has served on the United States Court of
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, recently completing a seven-year term as Chief Judge
of that court. Judge King is an alumna of Yale Law School and maintains her
chambers in Houston. This is nonetheless sort of a homecoming for her, not so
much in the sense of a past affiliation with Marquette as because she is, at least as I
see it (and as she sees it), from Milwaukee; she attended St. Robert's School in
Shorewood for eighth grade and, thereafter, Downer Seminary, one of the
precursors to the University School of Milwaukee. Because Marquette University
is Milwaukee's law school, no less than when that was our name (until 1908), this
gives us something of a connection to Judge King. It became official when Judge
King had the good judgment-I know that she agrees with me on the matter-to
hire Annie Owens, a Marquette lawyer (Class of 2005), as her law clerk during
2005-2006. We are delighted that Annie, currently working at a Washington law
firm before spending next year as a Bristow Fellow in the Office of the Solicitor
General at the Department of Justice, has come back for this lecture. So, in light of
these Milwaukee and Marquette connections, we regard Judge King as falling into
the Abrahamson-Sykes category of already being part of us.
Of course, no connection to the Law School is sufficient to warrant an
invitation to deliver the Hallows Lecture. One must also have something
interesting-preferably even challenging-to say. I am optimistic that Judge King
will meet this criterion as well. Please join me in welcoming our Hallows Judicial
Fellow, the Honorable Carolyn Dineen King.
The first half dozen years of the twenty-first century have been
characterized by steadily increasing concern on the part of judges,
lawyers, and academicians about serious challenges to judicial
independence that we face in this country. Many law reviews,
periodicals, and newspapers have contained articles on the subject, and
at least one recent television talk show featured a segment on judicial
independence. In September 2006, retired Supreme Court Justice
Sandra Day O'Connor and Justice Stephen Breyer convened a
conference in Washington, D.C. on the topic of "Fair and Independent
Courts" attended by several Supreme Court Justices and many of the
country's business leaders, representatives of the press, state and federal
judges, lawyers and academicians. While challenges to judicial
independence have been with us since the founding of the Republic,
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those that have produced the current ferment are viewed by some as
particularly troubling because they may be doing lasting harm.
What I would like to do today is to look first at why judicial
independence is critically important to our system of government. I will
move on to describe specific challenges to judicial independence that we
face in the federal court system. While my focus is on the federal
system, similar challenges are faced in the state court systems as well, a
point that came through loud and clear from comments made by
distinguished state court judges and practitioners at the O'Connor-
Breyer conference. Finally, I would like to pay particular attention to
the significant differences between how those challenges play out at the
Supreme Court level and at the level of the intermediate federal
appellate courts.
To define the contours of judicial independence and to show why it
is important in our system of government, some history is useful. I am
not a constitutional historian. But among the background papers
furnished to participants in the O'Connor-Breyer conference was an
excellent paper by Professor Jack Rakove of Stanford University on the
origins of judicial independence, and what follows borrows heavily from
that paper and its source material.1
The judiciary that the American colonists were familiar with was the
English judiciary. Before the eighteenth century, royal judges served at
the pleasure of the crown and, as Professor Rakove describes it, "courts
were often viewed more as active agents of royal power than as
impartial institutions mediating between state and subject."2  By
contrast, juries were viewed, at least by some political theorists, as
potentially independent of the crown. The Act of Settlement of 1701
established that royal judges would serve during good behavior and not
at the king's pleasure, and was intended to secure for judges the same
ability to act independently that juries were thought by some to possess.
But even after the Act of Settlement and the independence that it
secured for individual judges, the English judiciary continued as a part
of the executive, and the highest court of appeal was the House of
Lords. Further, the British government did not extend the Act of
Settlement to its colonies-one of the many bones of contention
between the American colonies and the British government. Instead,
1. Jack N. Rakove, The Original Justifications for Judicial Independence, in FAIR AND
INDEPENDENT COURTS: A CONFERENCE ON THE STATE OF THE JUDICIARY 43 (T.
Alexander Aleinikoff et al. eds., 2006).
2. Id. at 45.
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the colonists continued to have judges who served at the pleasure of the
crown, and, as a result, the colonists placed much faith in independent
juries (who decided questions of law and fact) to resolve their legal
problems.
After independence, the American states (unlike Great Britain)
adopted written constitutions of government. These constitutions were
greatly influenced by Baron Montesquieu's 1748 work, The Spirit of the
Laws, which set out, for the first time, a modern, tripartite theory of
separation of powers in which the judiciary was to be a separate entity.'
Montesquieu also described as the very definition of tyranny the
concentration of executive, legislative, and judicial power in the same
hands.4 The constitutionalists of the late eighteenth century took these
views to heart; for example, the 1780 Massachusetts Constitution, which
was largely drafted by John Adams, provided: "the legislative
department shall never exercise the executive and judicial powers, or
either of them: the executive shall never exercise the legislative and
judicial powers, or either of them: the judicial shall never exercise the
legislative and executive powers, or either of them: to the end it may be
a government of laws and not of men."5
In the years immediately after independence, the three branches of
state governments reflected in these first constitutions were not initially
viewed as co-equal, regardless of how they were defined in the
constitutions.6 Initially strengthened as a check on executive power, the
legislative branch had the most power, and the judicial branch was the
weakest of all. But as the state legislatures hastily began to legislate in
order to fight a revolutionary war and to raise the money and armies
necessary to do so, the results were sometimes extremely problematic
and burdensome for the former colonists, and criticism of state
lawmaking grew loud and frequent.7 Along with the criticism, however,
came the recognition that the legislatures' primary role as a check on
executive authority had been supplanted by their expanding
responsibility for carrying out the lawmaking essential to the young
nation. What was needed, no less than a check on executive power, was
a check on legislative power.
3. 1 BARON DE MONTESQUIEU, THE SPIRIT OF THE LAWS 151 (Thomas Nugent trans.,
Colonial Press rev. ed. 1900) (1748).
4. Id. at 152.
5. MASS CONST., pt. 1, art. XXX.
6. Rakove, supra note 1, at 48.
7. Id. at 49.
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James Madison, focusing on the want of "wisdom and steadiness" in
legislation,' saw the judiciary as having an important role in addressing
both legislative and executive abuses of power. Madison identified
judicial independence as central to this function, and like the English, he
defined the concept primarily in terms of tenure during good behavior,
with "fixed" and "liberal" salaries important as well.9
Alexander Hamilton also recognized the importance of an
independent judiciary as a bulwark against the encroachments of the
other two branches. In Federalist 78, for example, he stressed that
"though individual oppression may now and then proceed from the
courts of justice, the general liberty of the people ... can have nothing
to fear from the judiciary alone, but would have every thing to fear from
its union with either of the other departments." ' Hamilton believed
that complete independence is "peculiarly essential in a limited
Constitution," where courts are the only mechanism by which the
constitutional limitations placed on the legislature could be preserved."
Beyond these institutional dangers, he wrote that judicial independence
protects against the additional threats that surges of public opinion pose
to constitutional limitations and individual rights. 2 Like Madison,
Hamilton emphasized that life tenure was indispensable for the judicial
branch to remain independent, thereby preserving the judicial check on
these perils. 3 And to limit "an arbitrary discretion in the courts"
themselves-judges "making it up as they go along," in the words of
Professor Rakove' 4 -it was necessary to bind the courts, in the words
again of Hamilton, "by strict rules and precedents."15
Although lifetime tenure and fixed salaries would help secure
independence for the judiciary, more was required if the judiciary were
to be effective in countering the weight of elected legislatures. The
critical piece came in the form of a written constitution, to be drafted by
a convention called for that purpose and submitted to the people for
ratification. As Professor Rakove points out, a constitution developed
8. Letter from James Madison to Caleb Wallace (Aug. 23, 1785), in 2 THE WRITINGS OF
JAMES MADISON 166, 167 (Gaillard Hunt ed. 1901) (emphasis omitted).
9. Id. at 170.
10. THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 464-65 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed.,
1999).
11. Id. at465.
12. Id. at 468.
13. Id. at 468-70.
14. Rakove, supra note 1, at 54.
15. THE FEDERALIST No. 78, supra note 10, at 470.
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by these methods "could then be regarded as legally superior to
ordinary acts of government. And that in turn could enable
independent judges to enforce constitutional rules and norms against
the other branches of government., 16 Relatedly, an emerging doctrine
of judicial review was also percolating at the time of the Constitutional
Convention. Among the comments of the Framers were brief
indications that they understood the concept and that the decision to
award judges tenure on good behavior was designed in part so that they
could fulfill that duty. 17
The judicial role was further solidified by the Convention's
resolution of the critical question of how conflicts between national and
state laws would be resolved. The answer, of course, was the Supremacy
Clause, which made the Federal Constitution the supreme law of the
land and obliged state judges to enforce it as well. In one fell swoop, the
Constitution was established as fundamental law and the enforcement of
the division of power between the national government and the states
was made a judicial function. 8 Madison took some comfort in the role
that the Supreme Court would play as the tribunal which would
ultimately decide these boundary disputes. 19 But, he added: "The
decision is to be impartially made, according to the rules of the
Constitution; and all the usual and most effectual precautions are taken
to secure this impartiality."2  He clearly refers to the judicial
independence that lifetime tenure and fixed salaries were designed to
21promote.
The result of the Framers' efforts to establish an independent
judiciary is Article III, Section 1 of the Constitution. We are all familiar
with it, but it bears repeating:
The judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested
in one supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the
Congress may from time to time ordain and establish.
The Judges, both of the supreme and inferior Courts,
shall hold their Offices during good Behaviour, and shall,
at stated Times, receive for their Services, a
16. Rakove, supra note 1, at 50.
17. Id. at 50-51.
18. Id. at 52.
19. THE FEDERALIST No. 39 (James Madison).
20. Id.
21. Rakove, supra note 1, at 52.
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Compensation, which shall not be diminished during
their Continuance in Office.
To sum up, the Constitution provided for an independent judiciary,
separate from the elected branches. Its function was to enforce the
provisions of the Constitution and of what was likely to be a large body
of federal law-to hold the elected branches true to the Constitution
and federal law and to resolve disputes over the division of power
between the federal and state governments. Tenure during good
behavior and a salary which could not be diminished were the primary
mechanisms designed to secure the independence of the judicial branch.
The goal was judges who would not be subject to domination or
manipulation by the elected branches or by the shifting passions of the
people at large. And, as we have seen from Hamilton's writings, among
others, the judges themselves were to be constrained by the very laws
they were to enforce, constrained by "strict rules and precedents," in his
words, with the goal of limiting "an arbitrary discretion in the courts.,
22
In the words of a modern day Justice, Stephen Breyer, "judicial
independence revolves around the theme of how to assure that judges
decide according to the law, rather than according to their own whims or
to the will of the political branches of government."' Professor Dennis
Hutchinson of the University of Chicago has identified two premises
from Breyer's succinct formula. "First, the judicial independence is not
an end in itself but is an instrument in service of the rule of law.
Second.. . 'judges free from executive and legislative control will be in a
position to determine whether the assertion of power against the citizen
is consistent with law.'
' 24
Having described the origins and contours of judicial independence,
I turn now to current challenges to judicial independence that are
viewed by many as sufficiently serious as to threaten the judiciary's
ability to function as intended by the Constitution. I look first at how
the judiciary has fared with the President and with members of the
legislative branch.
22. THE FEDERALIST No. 78, supra note 10.
23. Stephen G. Breyer, Judicial Independence in the United States, 40 ST. Louis U. L.J.
989, 989 (1996).
24. Dennis J. Hutchinson, History of Attacks on Judicial Independence, Presentation at
the Workshop for Judges of the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit (October
6, 2005); see also Pamela S. Karlan, Judicial Independences, in FAIR AND INDEPENDENT
COURTS, supra note 1, at 40 ("[J]udicial independence is not an end in itself, but is rather a
means of ensuring freedom and the rule of law.").
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What we see is that the independence of the judiciary is being
challenged by a large volume of sometimes vitriolic attacks being
leveled at both the state and federal judiciaries. While attacks on the
judiciary are nothing new, they are nonetheless disturbing when they
reach the volume and pitch of those that we have witnessed in the last
several years. These attacks emanate from the President himself, who
with distressing frequency (particularly when an election is upon us)
takes the podium to decry "activist judges" at the state and federal level
who, in his view, are responsible for various decisions with which he and
members of his political base disagree. The term "activist judges" has
become, and is intended to be, a key rallying call to the political base,
not only from the President but also from members of both houses of
Congress and from the base itself.
The attacks on the judiciary are triggered most often by judicial
decisions, such as the Schiavo case, the Ten Commandments cases, the
pledge of allegiance case, and the eminent domain cases." After the
courts decided not to intervene in the Schiavo case, then House
Majority Leader Tom DeLay warned that the judges would have to
"answer for their behavior" in a court system "run amok. 26 Shortly
after Judge Lefkow's husband and mother were murdered and the
violence that occurred in a state courthouse in Georgia, Senator John
Cornyn took to the Senate floor to suggest some vague connection
between the deranged murderers responsible for "recent episodes of
courthouse violence" and "judicial activism. 27  To his credit, he
subsequently backed off of that. Although some have called for the
impeachment of judges responsible for the controversial decisions,
Representative James Sensenbrenner, then chair of the House Judiciary
Committee, rejected the notion that Congress should respond to cases
such as the Schiavo matter by attempting to neuter the courts through
the impeachment of judges. But even in rejecting impeachment, he
warned ominously, "This does not mean that judges should not be
punished in some capacity for behavior that does not rise to the level of
impeachable conduct., 28 He reserved the right to tinker with the courts'
jurisdiction, and he proposed the creation of an inspector general within
25. See generally Carolyn Dineen King, Current Challenges to the Federal Judiciary, 66
LA. L. REV. 661, 665-66 (2006).
26. Editorial, Hail of Criticism Batters Judges, Imperils Justice, U.S.A. TODAY, April 12,
2005, at 12A.
27. Angry at Rulings, Some Judge the Judges, ABC News, May 1, 2005,
http://abcnews.go.com/Nightline/LegalCenter/story?id=1028391 &page=1.
28. Clarity for the Judiciary, WASH. POST, May 11, 2005, at A16.
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the judiciary. Other congressmen have suggested that the way to rein in
the courts is to starve them, raising the specter that constraints on the
federal judiciary's budget, beyond those already resulting from the
escalating deficit, would be the payback for controversial decisions.
Judicial independence is undermined not only by these external
attacks but also by the high degree of political partisanship and ideology
that currently characterizes the process by which the President
nominates and the Senate confirms federal judges. It should be said at
the outset that, at least to some extent, this is nothing new. At several
points in our history, Presidents have scrutinized the ideological leanings
of prospective Supreme Court nominees with the goal of nominating
Justices with views compatible with the respective views or perceived
needs of those Presidents. President Franklin D. Roosevelt, for
example, was particularly careful about the views of nominees to the
Supreme Court and the intermediate federal appellate courts after the
Court's rulings in the early 1930s invalidating various pieces of New
Deal legislation that the President considered crucial to the recovery of
the nation from the Great Depression. The Senate has engaged in the
same kind of scrutiny as a part of the confirmation process.
Let me be clear: there is nothing inappropriate with political or
partisan considerations factoring into the judicial appointment process.
After all, the Framers vested the nomination and confirmation powers
in the elected branches of government, and it is to be expected that the
President and senators would seek judges whose judicial philosophies
seem consistent with their own.
That said, the last fifty years or so, and the last twenty-five years in
particular, have featured an ever increasing and contentious focus in the
nomination and confirmation process on whether candidates for the
Supreme Court and the intermediate federal appellate courts are
committed, either by reason of their background and experience or by
reason of explicit or implicit commitments they have made as a part of
that process, to particular positions on several politically salient issues
including abortion, civil rights, and the rights of criminal defendants.
The force of this change has been particularly felt by the intermediate
federal appellate courts, whose judges had been selected under the more
ideologically neutral system of patronage that generally guided
appointments until the 1960s. 29 Before talking about the ramifications
of the focus on political ideology for judicial independence and for the
29. NANCY SCHERER, SCORING POINTS: POLITICIANS, ACTIVISTS, AND THE LOWER
FEDERAL COURT APPOINTMENT PROCESS 13 (2005).
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rule of law, I would like to talk about what has been afoot during the
last half century that has played a role in the intense and widespread
interest in the political ideology of judicial nominees.
Beginning in the early 1950s, decisions by the Supreme Court, under
the leadership of Chief Justice Earl Warren, focused increasingly on the
constitutional rights of individuals, as distinguished from property or
business matters."° Perhaps the most famous is the 1954 decision in
Brown v. Board of Education, which struck down the so-called
"separate but equal" education of black citizens that prevailed in
Southern and adjoining states.31 Brown was only the first in a series of
Supreme Court decisions directed at dismantling laws that discriminated
against blacks in many aspects of their lives. During the 1960s, the
Court broadened the protections of criminal defendants under the
Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Amendments to the Constitution. This is the
era of the decisions that mandate the appointment of counsel for
indigent defendants in criminal cases,32 that require warnings for
suspects being interrogated designed to advise them of their
constitutional rights,33 and that require the exclusion from trial of
illegally obtained evidence," to name just a few.3" During the 1970s, the
Court recognized new rights for women under the Fourteenth
Amendment, with the most controversial case being the 1973 decision of
Roe v. Wade, in which the Court held that the Constitution protects a
woman's right to choose abortion during the early stages of her
36pregnancy.
The beneficiaries of these decisions had been largely unable to
obtain protection of these rights from the elected branches of
government. With the advent of these decisions, the federal judiciary
became the forum to which the disadvantaged (or those who perceived
themselves to be disadvantaged) turned to vindicate their rights.37 The
Supreme Court led the way, but the lower federal courts were entrusted
with fashioning remedies to enforce these rights.38
30. Id. at 13-14.
31. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
32. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
33. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
34. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
35. See SCHERER, supra note 29, at 14.
36. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); see also SCHERER, supra note 29, at 14.
37. SCHERER, supra note 29, at 15.
38. Id.
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Early successes in the federal courts attracted members for, and
energized, interest groups that were advocates for the disadvantaged.
The federal courts were seen by these groups as the place to achieve
social change. 9 By the mid-1970s, conservative interest groups, also
energized, stole a page from the book of the liberal interest groups and
sought to enlist the aid of the federal courts to overturn or narrow the
gains of the so-called liberal activists in the preceding twenty years.'
Beginning in the 1960s, these policy-oriented issue activists started to
ally themselves with the two major political parties: liberals allied
themselves with the national Democratic party and conservatives with
the national Republican party.4 With issue activists swelling the ranks
of the two political parties, or at least providing votes for their
respective candidates, and with the federal courts being seen by these
groups as a vital battleground, appointments to the Supreme Court and
the intermediate federal appellate courts became a critical element of
party policy. As Professor Stephen Burbank of the University of
Pennsylvania Law School puts it, the courts came to be seen as
fodder for electoral politics ... [with the view] that it is
appropriate to pursue chosen ends through the selection
of judges who are committed or will commit in advance
to pursue those ends on the bench. The impression
sought to be created is that not only are courts part of the
political system; they and the judges who make them up
are part of ordinary politics.
42
Burbank's observation was recently confirmed by the Federalist
Society's Executive Vice President, Leonard Leo, who said that in the




40. Id. at 16.
41. Id. at 13.
42. Stephen B. Burbank, Judicial Independence, Judicial Accountability, and Interbranch
Relations, in FAIR AND INDEPENDENT COURTS, supra note 1, at 190.
43. Robin Cook, Confirmation of High Court Justices Akin to Political Campaign, Leo
Says, UVA LAWYER, Fall 2006, at 14. In his remarkably candid comments, Leo described the
highly organized campaign to ensure nomination and confirmation of people committed to
conservative priorities. Among the "preemptive, rapidly reactive, and very strategic" tactics
that he and other conservatives employed for the recent nominations of John Roberts and
Samuel Alito were intensive research on the nominees, polling to determine how best to
frame the message to be given to the public about each nominee, extensive media interaction
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With this historical backdrop, a significant goal of the appointment
process for the Supreme Court and for the intermediate federal
appellate courts has become the appointment of judges who could be
relied upon to further the activists' policy agendas." The reason for this
seems to be that the leading political and issue activists in (or allied
with) each party are the ones who, if satisfied with the party's or a
candidate's position on critical issues, will mobilize the masses to turn
out on election day; if dissatisfied, they and their followers will either
stay home or, worse yet, actively campaign against the party or its
candidate.45
Particularly after the reported disappointment of Republican
administrations with Justice Souter's perceived infidelity to the ideology
of those administrations, reliability became vitally important. As
Professor Burbank points out, the risk that a judge might be won over
by the rule of law ideal or might experience a post-appointment
"judicial preference change" has caused some Presidents to seek
protection by nominating individuals whose preferences seem to be
"hard-wired.""'  For candidates whose views are less certain, the
candidate might be "induced nonetheless to commit to a desired path of
judicial decision in advance. 47
Another factor at work in the appointment process is the trend
towards selecting nominees for the Supreme Court from the
intermediate federal appellate courts. While this has the advantage for
the selection process of providing a nominee's track record and
information about his temperament-and the advantage for the
nominee of providing useful experience-it has the disadvantage of
creating an incentive for decisions made with an eye to advancement."
As Professor Vicki Jackson of the Georgetown University Law Center
describes it, "if lower court positions came to be viewed more as
'stepping stones' rather than 'capstones,' the temptation at the margin
to get that message out, and mobilization of grassroots conservative activists to contact
senators identified as being "on the fence" about a particular nominee and to convey
messages of support for that nominee. Id. at 14-15. Explaining the importance of a
consistent, aggressive media strategy designed to define the nominee as quickly as possible,
Leo remarked that "[y]ou can't just assume that the nominee's qualifications will by
themselves stand up to attack." Id. at 15.
44. SCHERER, supra note 29, at 23; Burbank, supra note 42, at 204.
45. SCHERER, supra note 29, at 22-23.
46. Burbank, supra note 42, at 204 (citing Theodore Ruger, Justice Harry Blackmun and
the Phenomenon of Judicial Preference Change, 70 MO. L. REV. 1209 (2005)).
47. Id. at 205.
48. See Karlan, supra note 24, at 29.
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for self-interested decision making might increase, especially in an
atmosphere in which confirmation battles focus more openly on
ideology. '' 9
A few years ago, I attended a symposium on judicial independence
at Yale Law School. ° After the speakers had made their presentations,
comments from the floor were requested and Judge Guido Calabresi of
the Second Circuit, formerly the dean at Yale, popped up from the back
row. He said that he had only been on the Second Circuit for a few
years, but that it was long enough for him to conclude that the greatest
threats to judicial independence were judges with ambition. He said
that many such judges were real candidates for advancement only in
their own minds.5 Nevertheless, a judge with ambition constantly has
his eye on what the Administration or the Senate Judiciary Committee
would think about a decision under consideration and how the decision
would affect his chances for advancement. Some such judges go around
the country making speeches to various interest groups, including well-
known groups that seem to me to be increasingly akin to political parties
or organizations, about their views on various hot-button issues. I
recognize that judges have First Amendment rights, but some of the
speeches that I have read seem designed to send signals or assurances
about their views on issues that may well come before them, thereby
enhancing their chances for promotion by the right President.
Several books and countless articles have been written on the
political ideology that each of the Presidents from Richard Nixon to
George W. Bush has looked for in his nominees to the Supreme Court
and the intermediate federal appellate courts and on the degree to
which that political ideology served as a litmus test for nomination." In
49. Vicki C. Jackson, Packages of Judicial Independence: The Selection and Tenure of
Article III Judges, in FAIR AND INDEPENDENT COURTS, supra note 1, at 73.
50. See generally King, supra note 25, at 668.
51. Id.
52. The party platforms for each election also provide some insight into the standards by
which each respective President has chosen his judicial nominees. For example, the 2004
Republican Party Platform said:
In the federal courts, scores of judges with activist backgrounds in the
hard-left now have lifetime tenure. Recent events have made it clear that
these judges threaten America's dearest institutions and our very way of
life. In some states, activist judges are redefining the institution of
marriage. The Pledge of Allegiance has already been invalidated by the
courts once .... And while the vast majority of Americans support a ban
on partial birth abortion, this brutal and violent practice will likely
continue by judicial fiat. We believe that the self-proclaimed supremacy
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the time that I have today, I cannot do more than provide a few brief
generalizations on that subject, generalizations that will necessarily be of
of these judicial activists is antithetical to the democratic ideals on which
our nation was founded. President Bush has established a solid record of
nominating only judges who have demonstrated respect for the
Constitution and the democratic processes of our republic, and
Republicans in the Senate have strongly supported those nominees.
It also stated:
We support the appointment of judges who respect traditional family
values and the sanctity of innocent human life.
Republican Party Platform of 2004, http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/showplatforms.php?plat
index=R2004.
The 1996 Democratic Party Platform discussed judicial appointments in conjunction with
civil rights law and affirmative action:
Over the last four years, President Clinton and the Democrats have
worked aggressively to enforce the letter and spirit of civil rights law. The
President and Vice President remain committed to an Administration that
looks like America, and we are proud of the Administration's
extraordinary judicial appointments-they are both more diverse and
more qualified than any previous Administration. We know there is still
more we can do to ensure equal opportunity for all Americans, so all
people willing to work hard can build a strong future. President Clinton is
leading the way to reform affirmative action so that it works, it is
improved, and promotes opportunity, but does not accidentally hold
others back in the process. Senator Dole has promised to end affirmative
action. He's wrong, and the President is right. When it comes to
affirmative action, we should mend it, not end it.
Democratic Party Platform of 1996, http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/showplatforms.php?plat
index=D1996.
The 1988 Republican Party Platform echoed the Republican platforms from 1980 and
1984, declaring:
We appointed judges who respect family rights, family values, and the
rights of victims of crime.
[W]e reaffirm our support for the appointment of judges at all levels of
the judiciary who respect traditional family values and the sanctity of
innocent human life.
Republican Party Platform of 1988, http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/showplatforms.php?plat
index=R1988.
And in 1976, the Democratic Party Platform said:
All diplomats, federal judges and other major officials should be selected
on a basis of qualifications. At all levels of government services, we will
recruit, appoint and promote women and minorities.
Democratic Party Platform of 1976, http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/showplatforms.php?plat
index=D1976.
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limited utility. Beginning with President Nixon, Republican Presidents
have promised to appoint only conservative judges-those who believe
in "strict construction" of the Constitution.53 Inherent in that promise is
a goal to reverse or greatly narrow the policy gains liberals were
perceived to have made in federal court litigation in the 1950s and
1960s, including gains in the areas of civil rights and the rights of
criminal defendants. President Reagan too emphasized that his
nominees must have a judicial philosophy "characterized by the highest
regard for protecting the rights of law-abiding citizens" and by the
"belief in the decentralization of the federal government and efforts to
return decision making power to state and local elected officials.""
And, as one might expect in the post Roe v. Wade era, President Reagan
promised to work for the appointment of judges "at all levels of the
judiciary who respect traditional family values and the sanctity of
innocent human life.
55
To achieve these ends, "[l]egislative, patronage, political, and policy
considerations were systematically scrutinized for each judicial
nomination to an extent never before seen."56 Under the direction of
Reagan's Attorney General Edwin Meese, lengthy, probing interviews
became common between Justice Department and White House
officials and prospective nominees with the goal of ascertaining in
advance how the nominees would rule on the political issues important
to the administration.57 Some nominees successfully resisted these
efforts, but the risk was that too much resistance could prove fatal to the
nominee.
The conservative political ideology sought by President Reagan has
been sought with equal intensity by both Presidents Bush.58 Their
selection efforts have been aided by conservative interest groups such as
the Federalist Society, which began to develop in the early 1980s. The
groups have come to provide forums and opportunities for advancement
53. See SCHERER, supra note 29, at 36; SHELDON GOLDMAN, PICKING FEDERAL
JUDGES: LOWER COURT SELECTION FROM ROOSEVELT THROUGH REAGAN 198 (1997);
Sheldon Goldman, Judicial Confirmation Wars: Ideology and the Battle for the Federal Courts,
39 U. RICH. L. REV. 871,888 (2005).
54. SCHERER, supra note 29, at 52, 55-56.
55. See id. at 58; GOLDMAN, supra note 53, at 297.
56. GOLDMAN, supra note 53, at 292.
57. Id. at 301-05.
58. See generally Goldman, supra note 53, at 877-89.
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for their members and valuable opportunities for Republican
administrations to vet their judicial nominees.59
The two Democratic administrations in the last thirty years have
differed somewhat from the Republican administrations in the way that
they attempted to satisfy party issue activists. Carter abandoned
patronage concerns and created so-called merit screening panels to
recommend qualified judicial nominees.6° Primarily, though, President
Carter sought to satisfy his liberal party base by appointing black and
female judges in large numbers, at least as compared with the number of
these judges appointed by prior presidents, and some merit screening
panels were given goals to strive for.6' Additionally, President Carter
ran on a platform that supported the decisions of the Warren Court, and
the selection criteria he established included that a recommended
nominee "possesses, and has demonstrated a commitment to equal
justice under law," which some conservatives viewed as a euphemism
for liberal ideology.62
From my own experience, the man who is now my husband, Circuit
Judge Thomas M. Reavley, and I were both identified by the merit
screening panel charged with finding potential judges for the western
half of the old Fifth Circuit (which stretched from Florida to Texas).
Neither of us was ever asked what our views were on issues important to
President Carter's supporters, although Judge Reavley's progressive
views on race issues were generally known because of his extensive
public service. I am a fourth generation Republican, and when I was
approached by the merit screening panel to see if I was interested in
applying for a circuit judgeship, I told the chairman about my
Republican lineage. He responded that President Carter did not care
what my politics were.
Like President Carter, President Clinton also sought to satisfy party
activists primarily by diversifying the federal bench.63 But he took a
more moderate approach than had President Carter on some issues,
including crime, and that approach was reflected in some of his
nominations." He also continued the Department of Justice/White
House interview process for intermediate federal appellate court judges
59. See SCHERER, supra note 29, at 109-10,124-25.
60. GOLDMAN, supra note 53, at 238.
61. Id. at 238-39, 242-43, 249; SCHERER, supra note 29, at 77-81.
62. Elliot E. Slotnick, Prologue: Federal Judicial Selection in the New Millennium, 36
U.C. DAvis L. REV. 587, 591-92 (2003).
63. SCHERER, supra note 29, at 83-85, 105.
64. Id. at 73.
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that began under President Reagan.65 Overall, I think it is fair to say
that both Presidents Carter and Clinton were careful not to appoint
judges with political views on the key issues that would be objectionable
to the Democratic Party's liberal base."
As political factors have increasingly come to bear on a president's
judicial nomination decision, the trend has been mirrored in the Senate
confirmation process, where interest groups have one last shot to derail
an undesirable nominee or to save an embattled one. Though
influential in the confirmation process for Supreme Court nominees
since at least the 1960s, interest groups really began to focus on lower
federal court confirmations in the 1980s. 7  One result has been the
increased use and threat of obstructionist tactics by senators to block
particular nominees or to influence the nomination process itself
through compromises.' Another consequence has been the pointed
questioning during Senate confirmation hearings that often attempts to
probe a controversial nominee's political leanings and the ways in which
a nominee would decide particular issues.
I need to end this description of the ideological pressures that have
become so prevalent in the judicial appointment and confirmation
processes with one very important caveat. Whatever may have been the
commitment of a President to his political base with respect to the
political ideology of his nominees, not every judge appointed by that
President has fit the description of what he was looking for; indeed,
happily for the Republic, many have not.
It is clear to me that, in the last fifty years, we have come a long way
from the goal of the Framers of a judiciary independent of the executive
and legislative branches. In the words of Circuit Judge Diarmuid F.
O'Scannlain of the Ninth Circuit:
By demanding to know in advance how a particular
nominee will rule in a given kind of case, the political
branches are exerting precisely the sort of direct control
over the judiciary that Hamilton and the other Framers
65. See generally Sheldon Goldman et al., Clinton's Judges: Summing up the Legacy, 84
JUDICATURE 228, 229-30 (2001).
66. SCHERER, supra note 29, at 73.
67. Id. at 108-09.
68. Id. at 109, 151-57.
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sought to avoid with the creation of a separate and
distinct third branch.69
But even without direct or indirect assurances as to how nominees
would rule, a highly partisan or ideological judicial selection process
conveys the notion to the electorate that judges are simply another
breed of political agents, that judicial decisions should be in accord with
political ideology, all of which tends to undermine public confidence in
the legitimacy of the courts. 70  The loss of public confidence in the
legitimacy of the courts--confidence that courts will decide impartially,
in accordance with the rule of law-could, in turn, undermine
compliance by the public with unpopular decisions.
Having described what.I believe to be the causes of the politicization
of the appointment process and how it has come to function, I would
like to examine how the structure of lower court decision making
combines with strong partisan or ideological views on the part of some
of its judges to imperil the fidelity of those judges' decisions to the rule
of law. I will do that by contrasting the way in which the Supreme Court
functions with the way in which a large intermediate federal appellate
court functions.
The current Supreme Court hears approximately eighty fully-briefed
cases a year. All nine Justices hear and decide each case. Virtually all
cases receive oral argument, at which questions can be explored with
counsel and alternative outcomes and rationales pursued by the Justices
themselves as well as by counsel. Every case receives a full opinion, and
there are often concurring opinions and dissents. These opinions are
circulated in draft form, with the Justices examining each critically and
asking questions and making suggestions. While constitutional scholars
and even the newspapers tell us that there are somewhat consistent
voting patterns7' by some Justices in some types of cases coming before
the Supreme Court, there is clearly no such thing as clique voting on the
Supreme Court. Every vote is carefully considered; a Justice concurring
in today's case may be dissenting in tomorrow's.
The result is that the record in the case, the relevant law, and the
resulting opinions are thoroughly vetted by nine of the country's
69. Diarmuid F. O'Scannlain, Today's Senate Confirmation Battles and the Role of the
Federal Judiciary, 27 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 169, 174 (2003).
70. See Jackson, supra note 49, at 67; Burbank, supra note 42, at 195-96.
71. See, e.g., The Supreme Court, 2005 Term: The Statistics, 120 HARV. L. REV. 372
(2006).
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toughest critics. First and foremost, the Justices are accountable to each
other for their work. Once the opinions are released, they are poured
over by academics, journalists of every kind and stripe, lawyers and the
public at large. The Justices are thus held accountable for their work,
indeed for their every word. As Chief Justice William Howard Taft
remarked: "Nothing tends more to render judges careful in their
decisions and anxiously solicitous to do exact justice than the
consciousness that every act of theirs is to be subject to the intelligent
scrutiny of their fellow men, and to their candid criticism.
72
Contrast this with the intermediate federal appellate courts. First,
the workload is different in quantity and quality. Using the most recent
year for which statistics are available, 2005, an intermediate federal
appellate judge on average participated in the termination on the merits
of 457 cases.73 Using another measure of workload, such a judge
authored 154 opinions and concurred in or dissented from 308 others,
for a total of 462 cases that bore his name.74 With the exception of a few
cases that are heard by the full en banc court, we sit in panels of three
judges. Only 20% of the fully briefed cases in the Fifth Circuit, to give
one example, are orally argued. As for differences in quality, most
intermediate federal appellate court cases do not demand the kind of
effort that most of the Supreme Court's cases require, and most would
have only one outcome, no matter who appointed the panel members.
But the sheer volume of cases means that not every case gets the full
attention of all three judges, let alone the full en banc court. Indeed, it
would be an unusual case in which more than one judge on the panel
reviewed the record; and not many cases benefit from an in depth study
of the applicable law by all three judges. This work pattern necessarily
means that the level of interaction between the judges hearing a case is
dramatically different than it is on the Supreme Court, and the level of
functional accountability for his work of each judge to other judges is
correspondingly different. As for external scrutiny, when our opinions
are issued, most do not receive thoughtful review by anyone other than
the parties. Some academics take an interest in some of our opinions, as
do some journalists and bloggers. But on the whole, our work does not
receive anything like the scrutiny that Supreme Court opinions receive.
72. Viet D. Dinh, Threats to Judicial Independence, Real and Imagined, in FAIR AND
INDEPENDENT COURTS, supra note 1, at 15.




This means that one or two of what Professor Burbank calls hard-
wired judges, whether liberal or conservative, on a panel can produce a
result that is not true to the rule of law, either because it is not faithful
to the record in the case or because it does not fairly apply the existing
law, without that fact being apparent to anyone other than the litigants.
In high-volume courts, judges are often effectively forced to rely on
"borrowed intelligence," i.e., to concur in opinions without a thorough
grasp of the record or the governing law, simply because there are not
enough hours in the day to acquire a thorough grasp of the record and
law in the 450 cases a year that are disposed of on the merits. It is not a
big step from there to clique voting, that is, voting with or at the
direction of other like-minded judges simply because they share
common ideological objectives, again without a good grasp of the record
or governing law. After three decades of judicial appointments based
on partisan ideology, it should come as no surprise that clique voting
happens, albeit infrequently, in more than one (but, I think, not many)
of our intermediate federal appellate courts. Madison, who warned
about the pernicious effects of factions in Federalist 10," would be
horrified to see them at work in some of our federal courts.
What does this mean for the rule of law, for the principle considered
so important to the Framers that judges are to decide cases according to
the law, rather than according to their own views of what the law should
be or to the will of the political branches or the popular masses? The
politicization of the appointment process, particularly for intermediate
federal appellate judges, presents a grave danger to the rule of law. A
judge who has been selected primarily for his perceived predisposition
to decide cases in accordance with a particular political ideology may be
consciously or subconsciously influenced to decide cases in accordance
with that ideology, rather than in accordance with an impartial and
open-minded assessment of what the law actually is. Professor Jackson,
having identified that possibility, downplays its effect. She says: "As a
normative matter, to think that judging is all about a judge's political or
policy attitudes is to miss the constraining force of law."76 But that view,
of course, assumes the point at issue. The constraining force of law may
be seriously weakened in the mind of a judge bent, either consciously or
subconsciously, on implementing a particular political or ideological
viewpoint. Such a judge, viewing a case through the prism of his
ideology, may misread or gloss over Supreme Court cases with holdings
75. THE FEDERALIST No. 10 (James Madison).
76. Jackson, supra note 49, at 71.
[90:765
CHALLENGES TO JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE
contrary or unhelpful to his ideological commitment. It bears
remembering that it is Supreme Court cases that are viewed as the
problem by many political or interest groups. Or such a judge may
misread the record in the case in such a way as to distort the question
presented or the evidence and thereby to facilitate the preferred
outcome. The result is a decision that is not faithful to the rule of law.
The overall result is some courts that are fragmented into ideological
groups, having ceased to function as a court in many cases coming
before them.
It is no answer to say that the Supreme Court is there as a
constraining force to restore the rule of law to a case in which an
appellate panel has not been faithful to the law. The judge bent on
implementing his ideology knows that appellate review of his decision is
highly unlikely. As Justice Scalia confirmed in his dissent in Kyles v.
Whitley-which is one of the rare modern Supreme Court cases that
solely involves the application of established law to the record-the
Supreme Court is not a court of error, and "[t]he reality is that
responsibility for factual accuracy, in capital cases as in other cases, rests
elsewhere-with trial judges and juries, state appellate courts, and the
lower federal courts.",
77
Instead, the Supreme Court generally takes cases where the law is
unclear or in need of further development or where the circuits are in
conflict. What this means is that the intermediate federal appellate
courts are the courts of the last resort for all but the handful of cases
that the Supreme Court will agree to hear. It is precisely that fact that
has resulted in the politicization of the intermediate federal appellate
court appointment process. Political and issue activists understand only
too well that ideologically committed judges on these benches can make
an enormous difference in the outcomes of hundreds of cases each year.
Too, it would be a mistake to think that ideologically committed judges
affect the outcomes only in cases that involve the so-called hot button
issues: the civil rights of racial and ethnic minorities and women;
abortion; the rights of criminal defendants; the death penalty; and states'
rights (or the proper balance of power between federal and state
governments). My own observations suggest that these judges cast a
much wider net. They have strong views on plaintiffs' jury verdicts,
especially (but not only) large ones; on class actions; on a wide range of
federal statutes imposing burdens on corporate defendants; on religion
in schools and in public areas; and on and on.
77. 514 U.S. 419, 458 (1995) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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If candidates for the presidency of both parties continue, as they
have now for decades, to energize issue activists within or allied with
their parties by promising the appointment of judges who will pursue
the respective political and ideological agendas of those parties in their
decisions, then judicial independence will continue to be severely
threatened, and with it the rule of law in the United States. The
Washington Post, in a 2005 editorial, captured the imminence of the
threat:
The war [over Justice O'Connor's successor] is about
money and fundraising as much as it is about
jurisprudence and the judicial function. It elevates
partisanship and political rhetoric over any serious
discussion of law. In the long run, the war over the
courts-which teaches both judges and the public at large
to view the courts simply as political institutions-
threatens judicial independence and the integrity of
American justice."8
Aside from changes in the political process, positive change could
also be effected within the court system itself if the Supreme Court were
to function somewhat more often as a court of error, making clear that
improper application of precedent will not be tolerated. While I
recognize that significant time restrictions prevent the Court from doing
so in the great majority of cases, even deciding a few such cases each
term could provide a significant check on ideologically committed
appellate judges, as no judge likes to be overruled by a critical opinion
from the Supreme Court. As Justice Stevens recognized in his Kyles
concurrence, "Sometimes the performance of an unpleasant duty
conveys a message more significant than even the most penetrating legal
analysis.,
79
The emphasis in the confirmation proceedings of Justice Alito on his
fidelity to the rule of law during his tenure as an appellate judge was
also a positive sign from two standpoints. First, it conveyed to the
public following the confirmation proceedings the importance of faithful
adherence to the law by a judge, no matter what his political leanings
were thought to be. Second, it just may have conveyed to judges
aspiring to higher office the notion that faithfully adhering to the rule of
78. Editorial, Not a Campaign, WASH. POST, July 3, 2005, at B6.
79. Kyles, 514 U.S. at 455 (Stevens, J., concurring).
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law is an important qualification for promotion and, conversely, that
there may be a price to be paid for failing to do so.
Perhaps the most positive development, at least as I see it, is the
powerful message that Chief Justice John Roberts has sent about the
approach that judges should follow in today's highly politicized
environment. In a recent interview with Professor Jeffrey Rosen of
George Washington University Law School that appeared in The
Atlantic Monthly, Chief Justice Roberts reminded us that Chief Justice
John Marshall's continuous effort to unify his Court, to urge his Court
to speak with one voice, was based on the recognition that a court so
unified fosters public respect for the legitimacy of the court as an
impartial institution that rises above ideology. 8° Chief Justice Roberts
also reported his first-hand observations of how the D.C. Circuit
countered the politicization of that court's appointment process by
working to achieve consensus, by "function[ing] as a court," as he put
it.81  From these models, Chief Justice Roberts observed that a
successful judicial temperament is marked by "a willingness to step back
from your own committed views of the correct jurisprudential approach
and evaluate those views in terms of your role as a judge."82  By
contrast, the "personalization of judicial politics,"'83 in which judges
pursue their ideological agendas at the expense of a unified court,
undermines the rule of law and may leave the public with the perception
that judges are little more than agents of the political powers that put
them in office.
It is not too late, as the Chief Justice suggested, for judges to follow
Marshall's example. By "refocus[ing] on functioning as an institution,"
courts can rebuild the institutional legitimacy that has been diminished
by the politicization characterizing the judicial appointment process for
the past thirty years. 84
80. Jeffrey Rosen, Robert's Rules, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Jan./Feb. 2007, at 104, 105,
113.
81. Id. at 111.
82. Id. at 113.
83. Id. at 106.
84. Id. at 105.
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